Abstract. SOL Secure Operations Language is a synchronous programming language for implementing reactive systems. The utility of SOL hinges upon the fact that it is a secure language, i.e., most programs in SOL are amenable to fully automated static analysis techniques, such as automatic theorem proving using decision procedures or model checking. Among the unique features of SOL is the ability to express a wide class of enforceable safety and security policies including the temporal aspects of software component interfaces in the language itself, thereby opening up the possibility of eliminating runaway computations and malicious code, such a s w orms and viruses.
Introduction
SOL is a synchronous programming language which supports a process for the speci cation, design, automatic analysis, and implementation of systems, more speci cally software-intensive distributed reactive computer systems as typi ed by safety-and security-critical applications in the aerospace, automotive, avionics, biomedical, military, nuclear, railway, and telecommunications industries. The process underlying SOL 4, 13 helps users construct precise and unambiguous system descriptions that are easy to understand and change, and that satisfy a number of application speci c as well as application independent properties such as consistency and completeness, safety, and security. Support in SOL for programming-in-the-large includes modules, interfaces, and automated analysis using assumption-guarantee style of reasoning. It is our belief that SOL provides a cost-e ective solution to industrial-strength problems.
Background
The design of SOL was motivated by the concern of building high assurance systems. High assurance entails the presentation of compelling evidence that a system satis es critical properties including functional properties i.e., properties of services that the system delivers, and other critical properties such as security, safety, timeliness real-time, survivability, and fault-tolerance. Since SOL is a synchronous data-ow language, programs in SOL are readily amenable to automatic static analysis techniques such as automatic theorem proving using decision procedures 6 or model checking 5, 7 . Admittedly, such a style imposes some limitations on expressiveness, which m a y pose a problem in certain circumstances 1 . One should keep in mind that it is precisely these limitations that make many i n teresting theorems about SOL programs decidable, thereby opening up the possibility of fully automated analysis for SOL programs.
Many researchers have been working on processes and tools for the speci cation, design, analysis, and implementation of safety-and mission-critical systems 4, 12, 20, 21 . One such approach, known as SCR Software Cost Reduction, was developed at the Naval Research Laboratory NRL to document the requirements of the US Navy's A-7 aircraft 2, 17 . One of the goals of SOL is to be able to directly implement speci cations of high-quality, such as the ones produced in SCR, in a safe and e cient manner. For illustrative SCR examples, see 5, 13, 14 . Researchers at NRL have provided a formal model for the SCR notation 5, 16 , based upon which a n umber of tools have been developed 6, 15 . For verifying programs in SOL, our intention is to build upon one of these tools, Salsa, which i s an invariant c hecker for state machine descriptions. Salsa establishes a formula as an invariant properties that are true in all reachable states by carrying out an induction proof that uses a tightly integrated set of decision procedures currently a combination of BDD algorithms and a constraint solver for integer linear arithmetic for discharging the veri cation conditions. The use of induction and a set of optimized heuristics enable Salsa to combat the state explosion problem that plagues current model checkers.
More recently, w e h a ve been investigating the problem of building secure distributed applications over the infrastructure of the Internet and the World Wide Web 3 . It is widely acknowledged that intelligent software agents are central to the development of the capabilities required to build robust, re-con gurable, and survivable distributed applications. However, agents technology carries with it the risk of security vulnerabilities such as denial of service, malicious code, and information leaks. The design philosophy of SOL is to give developers the ability to address the security problems outlined above using an easy-to-use graphical interface supported by powerful analysis and synthesis tools. Since agents in SOL are veri able, composable, and modular, SOL addresses the problem of statically determining emergent behavior 8 that eludes current agent design and implementation approaches. 1 A mitigating factor is the ability within SOL to invoke arbitrary methods i.e., functions written in traditional programming languages.
Related Work
The design of SOL was directly in uenced by the design of SAL the SCR Abstract Language, a speci cation language based on the SCR Formal Model 16 . SAL was designed to serve as an abstract interface for analysis tools such as theorem provers, model checkers, test case generators, and consistency checkers. SOL includes certain key features of SAL including the notion of events and modularity. The tool Salsa 6 uses SAL as the input language, and can perform automated analysis such a s c hecking a SAL speci cation for unwanted nondeterminism and missing cases, in addition to the veri cation of invariants. Although a theorem prover, Salsa a ords push-button" automation, ease of use, and counterexample generation that typify model checkers 5 .
Another language that in uenced the design of SOL was LUSTRE 11 , a language developed at the IMAG Institute in Grenoble. SOL resembles LUS-TRE in being a textual data-ow language, and in its ability to include program fragments i.e., methods calls from traditional programming languages in which it is embedded. However, SOL does away with the sometimes confusing notion of clocks of LUSTRE without sacri cing expressiveness SCR events are in essence self-timed" which o b viates the need for an explicit clock. The type system of SOL is richer than that of LUSTRE, and includes enumerated types, real, and string types, in addition to opaque types which m a y denote arbitrary ADTs abstract data types of the embedding language. It is important to note that the analysis tools of SOL will provide support for reasoning in this richer type system. Also, SOL borrows from POLLUX 22 , an extension of LUSTRE, the notions of tuples and arrays. F eatures of SOL not in LUSTRE include mechanisms for programming-in-the-large including modules, interfaces, and mechanisms for assumption-guarantee style proofs. Other features include the ability to directly specify a wide class of enforceable safety and security policies including the temporal aspects of software component i n terfaces using the theory of security automata in 1, 23 . 4 Secure Operations Language SOL 4.1 Events SOL borrows from SCR the notion of events 16 . Informally, an SCR event denotes a change of state, i.e., an event is said to occur when a state variable changes value. SCR systems are event-driven and the SCR model includes a special notation for denoting them. The notation @Tc denotes the event condition c became true", @Fc denotes condition c became false" and @Cx the event the value of expression x has changed". These constructs are de ned formally below. In the sequel, PREVx denotes the value of expression x in the previous state. Events may be triggered predicated upon a condition by including a when" clause. Informally, the expression following the keyword when is aged" i.e., evaluated in the previous state and the event occurs only when this expression has evaluated to true. F ormally, a conditioned event, de ned as @Tc when d def = :PREVc^c^PREVd; denotes the event condition c became true when condition d was true in the previous state". Conditioned events involving the two other event constructs are de ned along similar lines.
In SOL we extend the SCR event construct to include events that are triggered by the invocation of a method i.e., a procedure or function call of the embedding language. For example, the event associated with the invocation of method pushx of a stack is denoted as @push. This provides users the ability to implement security automata, a special class of B uchi automata that accept safety properties 1, 23 .
SOL Overview
In this section we give an informal overview of SOL using the stopwatch of 11 as a running example. We h a ve c hosen this example to illustrate the expressiveness, readability, usability, and formal veri cation capabilities of the SOL approach. Interested readers may refer to 11 to compare this approach with other synchronous languages such as Esterel, Argos, LUSTRE, and SIGNAL. Informally, the stopwatch includes a display of elapsed time and a button start stop that alternately puts the stopwatch in running" and stopped" states. Initially the stopwatch is stopped. It also receives a signal HS every 1=100 second, which i s used to compute the time spent in the running" state. The stopwatch includes a second button button 2 whose interpretation depends on the mode i.e., externally visible state of the stopwatch. When the stopwatch is stopped and the displayed time is running, the button is interpreted as a RESET command; otherwise it corresponds to a LAP command, which freezes the display while the stopwatch is still running.
In SOL, a system's behavior is described in terms of modules. A module declaration may include one or more attributes. The attribute deterministic declares the module as being free of nondeterminism which will be checked by the SOL compiler. Attribute reactive declares that the module will not cause a state change or invoke a method unless its visible environment initiates an event by c hanging state or invoking a method; moreover, the module's response to an environmental event will be immediate; i.e., in the next immediate step. Each module may contain state variables, each one falling into one of three categories: including itself which has no e ect on the dependency relation. A dependency graph may be inferred from the dependency relation by taking each v ariable in the module to be a node and including an edge from a to b if a depends on b 2 . The dependency graph of stopwatch is shown in Figure 1 . Note that monitored variables of the module appear to the left and controlled variables to the right. It is required that the dependency graph of each module is acyclic.
Intuitively, the execution of a SOL program proceeds as a sequence of steps, each initiated by a n e v ent known as the triggering event. Each step of a SOL module comprises a set of variable updates and method calls that are consistent with the dependency relation D m of that module. Computation of each step of a module proceeds as follows: the module or its environment nondeterministically initiates a triggering event; each module in the system responds to this event 2 The notion of a dependency relation is easily extended to the entire system. by updating all its dependent i.e., internal and controlled variables and or invoking methods. All updates and method calls of the system are assumed to be synchronous similar to the Synchrony Hypothesis of languages such as Esterel, LUSTRE, etc. 11 it is assumed that the response to a triggering event is completed in one step, i.e, all updates to dependent variables and all method calls are performed by the modules of the system before the next triggering event. Moreover, all updates are performed in an order that is consistent with the partial order imposed by the dependency graph. For the stopwatch example, module stopwatch responds to a triggering event 3 by updating its dependent variables in compliance with the dependency order see Figure 1 . One possible order is Timer Status ! elapsed time ! display ! Display Status.
The skeleton of the SOL module for stopwatch i s shown in Figure 2 . Note that C-style comments are supported all text between an opening *" and closing * " is ignored. Alternately, comments may begin with " and terminate by the end of the line. Comments may b e nested. The module de nition defn : lvalue "=" expr j lvalue "=" "initially" expr "then" expr ";" lvalue : ID j ID " " index " " j " " lvalue "," lvalue " " expr : value j "!" expr j expr bool binop expr j if expr j case expr j basic event j cond event j "PREV" "" expr "" j expr rel binop expr j "+" expr j "-" expr j expr arith binop expr j ID " " index " " j ID "" expr l ? "" j " " expr l " " j "" expr "" if expr : "if" " " " " expr "-" expr + "otherwise" "-" expr ? " " case expr : "case" expr " " " " value "," value "-" expr + "otherwise" "-" expr ? " " cond event : basic event "when" expr basic event : "@ID " "" expr l "" ? j "@T" "" expr "" j "@F" "" expr "" j "@C" "" expr "" expr l : expr "," expr value : index j REAL j STRING j "true" j "false" j "infinity" index : scalar value j scalar value ":" scalar value scalar value : ID j INT bool binop : "&" j "&&" j "|" j "||" j "= " j " = " rel binop : " " j " =" j "==" j "!=" j " " j " =" arith binop : "+" j "-" j "*" j " " Legend:
j Choice ? Optional Zero or more + One or more comprises a sequence of sections, all of them optional, each beginning with one or more keywords. User-de ned types are de ned in the type definitions section. Each e n try in this section consists of an identi er for the type, followed by its de nition, which m a y b e in terms of the built-in types, their subranges, or enumerated types.
SOL De nitions
The definitions section is at the heart of a SOL module. The syntax of SOL de nitions is shown in Figure 3 . This section determines how each i n ternal and controlled variable of the module is updated in response to events i.e., method calls or state changes generated either internally or by the module's environment. if" and enclosed in braces " " and " ". A guard is a boolean expression. The semantics of the conditional expression if f g 1 ! expr 1 g 2 ! expr 2 : : : g is de ned along the lines of Dijkstra's guarded commands 9 in a given state, its value is equivalent to expression expr i whose associated guard g i is true. If more than one guard is true, the expression is nondeterministic. It is an error if none of the guards evaluates to true, and execution aborts. The case expression case expr f v 1 ! expr 1 v 2 ! expr 2 : : : g is equivalent to the conditional expression if f expr == v 1 ! expr 1 expr == v 2 ! expr 2 : : : g. The conditional expression and the case expression may optionally have a n otherwise clause with the obvious meaning. In this paper, we shall not elaborate on the tuple and array constructs of SOL see 22 for details.
The de nitions of module stopwatch, shown in Figure 4 , have a direct correspondence to phrases in the prose speci cation. For example, statements @Tstart stop when Timer Status == stopped -running @Tstart stop when Timer Status == running -stopped correspond to the phrase : : : the button start stop alternately puts the stopwatch in`running' and`stopped' states".
Assumptions and Guarantees
The assumptions of a module, which are typically assumptions about the environment of the subsystem being de ned, are included in the assumptions section. It is up to the user to make sure that the set of assumptions is not inconsistent, i.e., a logical contradiction. Users specify the module invariants in the guarantees section, which is automatically veri ed by a tool such as Salsa. The syntax for specifying module assumptions and guarantees is identical to that of module de nitions, in other words, we have the expressiveness of the full language in these clauses. This does not have a detrimental e ect on the proof tools, since most commonly encountered theorems about SOL programs are decidable.
The assumptions and guarantees for the stopwatch example are shown in Figure 4 . The assumption NAT speci es that all the monitored variables of the module are false in the initial state and that in all subsequent states at most one of the monitored variables is true. The guarantees are a formalization of the sentence If button 2 is pressed when the stopwatch is running and active, it becomes frozen; when it is pressed when the stopwatch is frozen, it becomes active." from 11 .
Formal Veri cation
Salsa is a tool for the veri cation of synchronous reactive systems. The veri cation performed by Salsa is invariant c hecking in addition to consistency checking 16 which ags undesirable instances of nondeterminism and missing cases in a module. Consider the following code fragment of stopwatch: The above problem may be reduced to checking whether the expression initially true then :e 1^e2 " is an invariant of stopwatch. All the disjointness veri cation conditions of stopwatch w ere veri ed automatically by Salsa in about a tenth of a second. Along similar lines, one can prove that the properties in the guarantees section are invariants. These too were veri ed automatically by Salsa in under a second. If an invariant is not provable, Salsa returns a counterexample. However, one should keep in mind that due to the incompleteness of induction, users must validate that the returned counterexample is reachable. By examining the counterexamples, users will be able to either determine that there is a problem or will have to prove additional invariants as lemmas in order to prove the original invariant.
Enforcement Automata
In this section, we shall examine how enforceable safety and security policies 23 are expressed in SOL as enforcement automata also known as security agents 3 . The enforcement mechanism of SOL works by terminating all executions of a program for which the policy being enforced no longer holds. For reasons of readability and maintainability, w e prefer to use explicit automata for enforcing deterministic 
Safety Automata
We examine how SOL automata are used to enforce safety policies. The example we shall use is a stack, which has the associated methods push, pop, and top. Informally, pushx pushes the value of integer variable x on the stack and pop pops the topmost value o the stack. The method top returns the current v alue at the top of the stack. The stack can accommodate at most max depth items. The safety policies we wish to enforce are: i No more than max depth items are pushed on the stack. ii Invocations of methods top and pop are disallowed on an empty stack. The classical way of specifying the correct use of a stack w ould be to write a so-called class invariant, often speci ed as predicates on the old" and new" values of program variables. Languages such as Ei el 19 with explicit support for Design by Contract 18 include constructs for specifying and checking such invariants. However, presently popular object-oriented programming languages lack such mechanisms, and therefore treat class invariants mostly as comments, and provide no tool support to analyze them. A unique feature of SOL is the ability to perform such c hecks on existing implementations in a language-neutral manner. Figure 5 shows a SOL module safestack which enforces these safety policies on all SOL modules which use the stack object implemented in the embedding language. Figure 6 is the module safestack rendered in the visual syntax of SOL. Note that by deliberately omitting the otherwise clauses in the if statements, we abort the execution of the program when none of the guards is true. If this is too drastic, corrective action may be speci ed in an otherwise clause; for example, to ignore all push actions when the stack is full.
Security Automata
We use the example from 23 to illustrate how we may implement a security policy that allows a software agent to send data to remote hosts using method send a s w ell as read local les using method file read. However, invocations of send subsequent t o file read are disallowed. It is di cult, if not impossible, to con gure current systems to implement such a policy. F or example, it cannot be implemented in the sandbox" model of Java 10 in which one may either always or never allow access to a system resource. As shown in Figure 7 , this policy is easily implemented in SOL. interpreter includes support for security such as authentication, authorization, non-repudiation, and con dentiality and decentralized distributed execution, for which w e need to address associated problems such as fault-tolerance, load balancing, self-stabilization, and survivability. Another area of research i s t o p r o vide support for implementing hard real-time systems.
